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New  ventures  as  well  as  new  business  units  experience  significant  difficulties  in  finding  a viable  market 
application  or  business  model.  They  often  need  to  adapt  their  initial  business  model  and  this  need  for 
adaptation  is  mainly due to high degrees of uncertainty and ambiguity they are confronted with. This  paper 
hypothesizes  that  adaptation  is  crucial  for  new  ventures'  and  new  business  units'  survival,  but  that 
differences  exist  between  the  need  for  adaptation  in  business  units  of  established  companies  versus  in 
independent  start-ups.  According  to  insights  obtained  from  institutional  isomorphism  as  well  as  from  the 
resource-based  theory  of the  firm,  the  effects of adaptation  on  survival  are complex  and  multifaceted.  We 
test the adaptation-survival hypothesis through a survival analysis of a sample of 117 new ventures and new 
business  units.  We  find  that  the  main  effect  of  adaptation  on  survival  is  negative,  but  that  this  effect  is 
moderated and  even reversed  by the  (in) dependence of the new business and  by the industry in which it is 
active. INTRODUCTION 
One  of  the  most  pertinent  questions  in  the  field  of  entrepreneurship  research,  as  suggested  by 
Venkataraman  (1997,  p.  121)  is  "  ... why  when  and how some  [entrepreneurial  companies]  are  able  to 
discover and exploit opportunities while others cannot or do nor Various authors have put forward that it  is 
not the clairvoyance of the entrepreneur or intrapreneur that determines this ability.  There  exists  evidence 
that most initial selections of market applications by new businesses have to be abandoned later on and that 
minor or major adaptations to the initial business model are needed. 
Pitt and  Kannemeyer (2000)  question whether many entrepreneurs are able to define the concept correctly 
from  the outset. To paraphrase Stoica  and  Schindehutte (1999:  p.  1): "Entrepreneurs start with a vision .... 
When successful it is because they are able to translate this vision into a business concept that addresses a 
marketplace  need.  .  ..  only  in  a minority  of  cases  do  entrepreneurs  succeed  because  they  define  their 
concept  correctly  from  the  beginning,  and  rarely  do  they  immediately  achieve  a good  fit  between  the 
available opportunity  and their approach to  the  business concept." Or as  Peter Drucker (1985:  p.  189)  has 
noted:  "When a new venture does succeed,  more often than not it is in a market other than the one it was 
originally intended to serve,  with products and services not quite those with  which it had set out,  bought in 
large part by customers it did not even think of when it started, and used for a host of  purposes besides the 
ones for which the products were first designed. "Existing research data confirms this.  Brokaw (1991), in her 
update of the twenty seven ventures that were profiled  in  Inc.'s "Anatomy of a Start-up" series between the 
period  of 1988 and  1990, found  that  by  1991,  a large fraction  of the  surviving  ventures  had  adapted  their 
initial  business  model:  "What has made or broken many of the companies we've  watched. .  .is  ...  the ability 
(or inability) to recognize and react to the completely unpredictable  ...  To be flexible,  and not just in response 
to small surprises but to really big ones - like discovering you're selling to  the wrong customers or selling 
through entirely wrong  channels.  Some  companies  even find they have  to revamp  from  top  to  bottom in 
order to survive.  They discover they're in the wrong business" (Brokaw, 1991: p. 54). 
Although  the  importance  of  adaptation  for  new  ventures  is  widely  accepted,  relatively  little  research  has 
been  done to investigate the precise effect of the initial business model's adaptation on  the survival of new 
businesses.  Stoica  and  Schindehutte  (1999)  investigate  the  relationship  between  adaptation  and 
performance,  and  a number  of  factors  and  activities  enabling  adaptation.  Although  their  research  study 
provides  interesting  results,  we  do  not  believe  the  sample  - where  the  typical  firm  has  been  in  business 
between  5 and  25  years,  and  has  fewer  than  100  employees  - to  be  representative  of 'new'  ventures  or 
business units.  Pitt and  Kannemeyer (2000)  use a sample of companies  less than five years old.  However, 
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propensity)  on the degree to which  marketing strategy had changed,  but do  not investigate the relationship 
between adaptation and performance or survival, nor any factors that might affect this relationship.  Morris et 
al.  (1999)  do  suggest that  ambiguity,  risk  and  the  entrepreneur's  control  over  key  variables  influence  the 
need for adaptation  in  entrepreneurial companies,  but they  do  not investigate these effects empirically.  To 
our knowledge, existing work takes for granted the need for adaptation in new businesses, and does not pay 
sufficient attention to company and industry characteristics that may influence this need. 
We should note that the concept of adaptation described above is different from the one used in literature on 
established companies  (see for example the work of Tuominen  et aI.,  2002;  Oktemgil  and  Greenley,  1997; 
Hrebiniak and  Joyce,  1985,  Van  de  Ven  and  Poole,  1995,  Jankowicz,  2000,  Burgelman,  1991).  The  latter 
regards  adaptation  as  an  organization's response to changes  in external factors,  threats and  opportunities. 
Organizational  adaptation  or change  is then  defined  as  "" .  change in a significant organizational attribute, 
such  as  basic  business  strategy  or  organizational  structure  in  response  to  environmental  changes ... " 
(Kraatz,  1998). While Kraatz' definition of adaptation suggests that companies  need to adapt to changes  in 
their  environment  the  entrepreneurial  adaptation  on  which  this  paper  focuses  is  needed  regardless  of 
environmental  change.  It  is  about  entrepreneurs  and  ventures  who  need  to  find  their  place  in  the 
environment,  or  even  about them  finding  the  most appropriate  environment.  Therefore,  we  cannot  readily 
apply insights on adaptation in established firms to new businesses. 
Based  on  this  overview,  it  is  obvious  that  the  relationship  between  adaptation  and  survival  in  new 
businesses - alongside potential moderating factors - deserves further research.  If the need for adaptation 
in  order to  survive  is  moderated  by  company  and  industry  characteristics  (as  suggested  by  Morris  et  aI., 
1999), then  adaptation  strategies - and  maybe  also the  specific  enablers for adaptation  - should  be  made 
contingent on  these  characteristics.  The  aim  of this  paper  is  to  look at the  effects of these  company  and 
sector  characteristics.  Firstly,  we  discuss  the  difficulty  new  businesses  have  in  finding  a viable  market 
application or business model. We suggest that they need to adapt their initial business model and that this 
need for adaptation is mainly due to high degrees of uncertainty and ambiguity they are confronted with. We 
hypothesize that  adaptation  will  be  crucial  for  new  business'  survival.  Secondly,  we  hypothesize that  the 
need for  and the survival effect of adaptation differs between business units of established  companies  and 
independent start-ups. Thirdly, hypotheses are formulated with respect to the direct and moderating effect of 
sector characteristics.  Finally,  we  test these  hypotheses through  survival  analysis  of a sample  of 117  new 
businesses, controlling for industry effects. 
3 LITERATURE OVERVIEW 
New businesses on the search for viable market applications 
New  businesses  often  start from  a vision  or  from  a technological  capability.  In  both  cases,  the  initial  idea 
needs to  be translated into an economic reality through the development of a business model  (Chesbrough 
and  Rosenbloom,  2002).  The  business  model  is  then  considered  a construct  that  mediates  the  value 
creation  process,  by  selecting  and  filtering  technologies  and  ideas,  and  packaging  them  into  particular 
configurations to be offered to a chosen target market. The functions of a business model are  "to articulate 
the  value proposition,  identify a market segment,  define the structure of the  value chain,  estimate the cost 
structure  and profit potentia!,  describe  the  position  of the  firm  within  the  value  network,  formulate  the 
competitive strategy" (Chesbrough  and  Rosenbloom,  2002:  p.  533-534).  This  definition  corresponds to  the 
notion  of 'market  application',  and  in  the  remainder  of this  paper,  the  terms  business  model  and  market 
application will  be used interchangeably. 
Because  both  technical  and  market uncertainty are  involved  in this  translation  and  because environments 
may change rapidly, the set of all feasible business models is not foreseeable in advance (see also the work 
of  Druilhe  and  Garnsey,  2002  and  2004  on  university  spin-outs).  This  difficult  search  for  viable  market 
applications  is  largely  due  to  the  uncertainty  and  ambiguity  new  businesses  are  confronted  with.  This  is 
especially the case for technology-based businesses that are coping with high degrees of both technical and 
market newness (see also Morris et aI.,  1999; Shane and Stuart  2002). Certainly during the early stages in 
its  life,  a new  business  is  confronted  with  high  degrees  of  both  uncertainty  and  ambiguity  while  having 
access to  a limited  knowledge and  experience base  and while  experiencing restricted  access to resources 
as it tries  to  bring  a new product or service application  to  the  market (see for example:  Bhide,  2000).  The 
underdeveloped  resource  base  of the  new  business  may  hence  negatively  affect  its  chances  for  survival 
and  subsequent  performance  (Wernerfelt  1984).  When  initially  developing  a  market  application,  the 
business  often  faces  uncertain  innovation  targets,  unclear  product  performance  requirements  and 
ambiguous  design  criteria.  Innovations are  by  definition  only  successful  when  they  succeed  in  coupling  a 
technological  capability  to  a  user  need  (Teubal  et  aI.,  1991).  During  this  process,  innovations  face 
considerable  selection  pressures on their way to  commercialization  (Nelson  and Winter,  1982).  Not only  is 
the  nature and  the  outcome of the technical activities inherently unpredictable  (Steensma  et aI.,  2000),  but 
also the market selection and commercialization process itself poses problems of uncertainty and ambigUity 
(Chesbrough,  2003;  Chesbrough  and  Rosenbloom,  2002;  Chesbrough,  2002).  Utterback  (1987)  therefore 
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respect  to  markets  has  an  even  larger  effect  on  the  development  of  opportunities  than  technological 
uncertainty  (Eisenhardt  and  Schoonhoven,  1990;  Autio  and  Lumme,  1989;  Saemundsson  and  Lindholm 
Dahlstrand, forthcoming). The range of options - and problems -that founders of new businesses confront is 
vast.  Entrepreneurs  and  intrapreneurs  must continuously  ask  what  application  they want  to  strive  for  and 
what competencies  they  need  to  develop  in  order to  accomplish  that prowess  (Bhide,  1996).  In  emergent 
markets,  technological  options  are  at  best  marginally  understood,  distribution  channels  and  sources  of 
supply are problematic,  market needs are not clearly defined, and  hence,  market viability cannot be proven 
a priori (see Abernathy and Utterback, 1975 & 1978; Debackere, 1997; Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1990; 
Bhide,  1992,  1994,  1996  & 2000;  Teubal  et  aI.,  1991).  These  uncertainties  and  ambiguities  can  also  be 
seen as corollaries of the liabilities of smallness and  newness new businesses are facing  (see  Hannan and 
Freeman, 1977, and Stinchcombe,  1965 for their respective original definitions). 
As  a logical  consequence,  it  is  not  possible  for  a venture  to  identify upfront what  will  be  the  most  viable 
business model or market application.  Uncertainty and risk induce the  need to  change the  business model 
(Pitt  and  Kannemeyer,  2000).  In  general,  high  levels  of  uncertainty  are  known  to  require  adaptive 
organizational  processes  (Timmons et aI.,  1990). Market signals may reveal  information about the external 
environment that was unknown or uncertain at the outset indicating a possible need to change or adapt the 
initial  business  model  (Stoica  and  Schindehutte,  1999).  As  Stoica  and  Schindehutte  (1999)  put  it:  "The 
adaptive  entrepreneur allows the  business concept to  develop over time as he/she gains experience  with 
products,  markets,  suppliers,  employees,  and other key variables surrounding the  enterprise" (Stoica  and 
Schindehutte,  1999:  p.  1-2).  In  the  context  of  new  venture  development  adaptation  thus  refers  to  the 
entrepreneur's  willingness  and  ability  to  make  appropriate  adjustments  to  the  business  concept  and 
marketing approach as the venture evolves from an  initial idea or business plan through the early stages of 
the  organizational  life-cycle  towards  a more  stable  business  (Morris  et  aI.,  1999;  Pitt  and  Kannemeyer, 
2000). 
Literature  on  established  firms  (McGee,  Varadarajan  & Pride,  1989)  as  well  as  on  new ventures  points to 
the  danger  of  not  only  'under-adaptation',  but  also  'over-adaptation'.  As  explained  by  Stoica  and 
Schindehutte  (1994,  p. 7):  'under-adaptation  can  lead  to  unintended  costs  (especially  inventory),  low 
customers,  and  missed  opportunities.  Over-adaptation  utilizes  resources  unnecessarily,  may  find  the  firm 
under-emphasizing  its  core  business,  and  frequently finds  the  firm  pursuing  courses  of action  that  do  not 
generate  requisite  payoffs.'  Stoica  and  Schindehutte  (1994)  propose that the  danger  of over-adaptation  is 
especially  present  in  entrepreneurial  businesses.  They  point  out that  entrepreneurs  are  opportunists,  but 
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they will spread out their resources too thin over various opportunities, reducing the possibility to succeed  in 
any of them. We therefore hypothesize that: 
H7:  There  is an inversed u-shaped relationship between adaptation of a new business' business 
model and its survival. 
Effects of the new business' background or heritage 
Differences  in  the  need  for  adaptation  may  arise  between  businesses  with  different  backgrounds  or 
heritages.  Some research suggests that new business units of existing companies will  have fewer problems 
defining  a viable  market  application  or  business  model  - and  thus  less  need  for  adaptation  - than 
independent  start-ups.  In  his  study  of the  internal  corporate  venturing  process,  Burgelman  (1983)  shows 
how the initiation of the project definition process involves technical linking as well as need linking activities. 
While the new product,  process,  or system is still  in the definition process,  market interest already needs to 
be  created.  Burgelman  observes  that  unauthorized  selling  efforts  are  started  even  before  the  project 
becomes  an  official  venture.  This  is  only  possible  because  group  leaders  have  direct  involvement  in 
research activities and sufficient awareness of market needs. Also Zucker et al.  (2002) find that new biotech 
units of established firms  obtain  more and  higher-quality patents than  new entrants.  Since patents need  to 
demonstrate  potential  practical  applicability,  this  could  be  considered  an  indication  that  new  units  of 
established firms are better at making a first step towards technology commercialization. 
There  is a two-pronged argument stemming from  institutional isomorphism that should  be understood  here. 
Based  on  institutional  isomorphism  (DiMaggio  and  Powell,  1983),  we  might  expect  Significant  'imprinting' 
from  the mother organization  on  the  new business  unit.  This imprinting  can  provide the  new  business unit 
with significant up front knowledge on technologies, markets and organization itself. This up front knowledge 
can  be  hypothesized  an  advantage  when  the  new  business  unit  will  be  operating  in  product-market 
environments in which it can  benefit from this imprinting.  Under those circumstances, the new business unit 
will  need  less  adaptation  to  survive.  There  is  a darker  side to  this  argument  as  well,  though.  Institutional 
isomorphism also implies a certain degree of inertia: administrative heritage shapes patterns and routines in 
the  new  business  unit  that  makes  it  more  difficult  for  the  business  unit  to  adapt.  Hence,  in  those 
circumstances where the  new  business unit will  be operating  in  a new product-market environment where 
the  imprinting  becomes  a  liability  rather  than  an  asset,  adaptation  will  become  highly  relevant  and 
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more difficult and hence survival less guaranteed. 
As  a consequence,  it  does  not astonish  that  quite  some  research  insights  evidence  point to  the  need  for 
intrapreneurs to  be  equally  adaptable.  In  one  of the  corporate  ventures  studied  by  Burgelman  (1983),  the 
initial focus of the project to  improve plastics turned out to  be on  bottles of the wrong size. Although a basis 
for corporate support had been acquired, adaptation was necessary. Chesbrough (2002) even suggests that 
corporate ventures need to  be even more adaptable than independent start-ups, because they need to free 
themselves from the dominant business logic of the  parent company.  In  his study of 35  Xerox  spin-offs,  he 
found that  "  ... those spin-offs that became successful did so through evolving business models that came to 
differ substantially from  that of Xerox ... " (Chesbrough,  2002,  p.  529).  In  his  review  of  different  literature 
streams  on  employee  startups  in  high-tech  industries,  Klepper  (2001)  points  out  that  incumbents  have 
serious  difficulties  in  assessing  and  implementing  certain  types  of  innovation,  such  as  architectural 
innovations  (Henderson  and  Clark,  1990),  competence-destroying  innovations  (Tushman  and  Anderson, 
1986)  and  innovations  that  appeal  to  new  users  due  to  reliance  on  feedback  from  current  customers 
(Christensen,  1993).  This  suggests  that  new  business  units  of  established  firms  might  under  certain 
circumstances, even experience greater difficulties than independent start-ups in defining the initial business 
model and therefore will need to be more adaptive afterwards. These findings are in line with the arguments 
as they emerge from institutional isomorphism as mentioned above. 
Based on these insights, we hypothesize that: 
H 2a:  The effect of  business model adaptation on failure rates differs between independent start-
ups and business units of  established corporations. 
In  addition,  the  (in)dependence  of the  new  business  may  have  a direct  effect  on  failure  rates.  The  high 
mortality risk new ventures are facing  is often seen as a consequence of liabilities they are confronted with 
from their conception onwards.  In general. we can discern between the liabilities of smallness and newness. 
The  liability  of  smallness  hypothesis  points  to  the  relationship  between  size  and  mortality.  The  theoretic 
rationale behind this hypothesis dates back to Hannan and  Freeman's original paper on population ecology 
(1977).  in  which they state that 'the appropriate time scale for a selection process increases with the size of 
the  organizations  under consideration'.  Explanations  for  this  phenomenon  are  related  to  the  environment 
(given  resource-based  arguments)  favoring  organizations  with  structural  inertia  (Singh  and  Lumsden, 
1990:176),  scale  effects  (Barron  et  aL  1994:388),  and  to  the  availability  of  'slack  resources'  in  larger 
organizations (Haveman,  1993): financial  resources  (Berry & Taggart,  1998;  Bhide,  1992,  1994,  1996;  Hite 
7 & Hesterly,  2001),  as  well  as  human  capabilities  (Steensma  et  aI.,  2000;  Baum  et  aI.,  2000;  Mc  Cartan-
Quinn and Carson,  2003). 
Complementary to this  liability of smallness,  the liability of newness  is  often  identified  as a major cause of 
mortality  (Shepherd  et  aI.,  2000;  for  an  overview  see  Eisenhardt  & Schoonhoven,  1990).  The  theoretical 
explanation  goes  back  to  Stinchcombe's  (1965)  observations  that  new  organizations  have  higher  failure 
rates than older ones,  which  is  known  as the 'liability of newness'.  Hannan  and  Freeman  (1984)  argue that 
in  modern  societies  and  markets  (commercial  as  well  as  financial)  organizations  with  high  levels  of 
'reliability'  and  'accountability'  are  favored  by  selection  processes.  New  ventures  lack a 'track  record'  with 
customers and suppliers (see also Hay et aI., 1993), and the employees and founders of these ventures are 
not always able to  quickly assume  the  new  roles  and  relationships that are  reqUired  from  them  in  order to 
thrive.  Business  relationships  with  stakeholders  need  to  be  built  legitimacy  and  reputation  need  to  be 
established,  new  employees  must  be  recruited  and  trained  (Lu  & Beamish,  2001;  Hite  & Hesterly,  2001). 
Shepherd  et  al.  (2000)  suggest  that  this  newness  or  novelty  consists  of  novelty  to  market  novelty  in 
production,  and  novelty to management.  Hay  et al.  (1993)  point to the existence of an  'asset accumulation 
gap'  that  ventures  must close  in  order  to  satisfy  early  customers  and  outperform  established  rivals.  Also 
Zahra  et al.  (2000)  suggest that even when  offering a superior technology or product ventures must learn 
new  skills  and  competencies  in  order  to  position  their  products  successfully  and  to  survive.  Also  Bhide 
(2000)  points to the need for the new venture to quickly learn to develop and deploy organizational routines 
such as coordination mechanisms in order to cope with the environmental challenges they face. 
The liabilities of smallness  and  newness both refer to a lack of resources,  capabilities or knowledge within 
the  new  business.  Whereas  independent  businesses  need  to  acquire  these  resources,  capabilities,  and 
knowledge  through  learning  (Shepherd  et  aI.,  2000),  networking  and  partnering  (Shepherd  et  aI.,  2000; 
Foray,  1991; Teubal et aI., 1991;  Baum et aI.,  2000),  business units of established companies might benefit 
from the resources,  capabilities and knowledge present in the parent organization.  Bhide (2000) shows how 
employees  of established  corporations who  develop  new  initiatives,  can  use the  cash  flows,  relationships, 
and reputation  provided by existing businesses. This helps them to secure customers, employees and other 
resources for their start-up.  Liabilities of newness and smallness will therefore be less an  issue  in  business 
units of established companies than in independent start-ups. 
Consequently, we should verify whetheri: 
H2b: New business units of  established companies have lower failure rates than independent new 
ventures. 
8 Sector effects 
In  addition  to  the  background  of the  new  business,  the  sector in  which  it operates  may  have a direct and 
indirect  effect  on  survival.  Various  studies  have  demonstrated  that  industry  in  characteristics  have  a 
significant effect on  survival rates.  Audretsch  (1991)  already showed that the existence of scale economies 
and a high degree of capital intensity lowers the likelihood of survival  (see also van  Praag,  2003 and Almus 
and Nerlinger, 1999 on the effect of external factors on growth and survival). 
These industry characteristics may equally affect the need for adaptation of the initial business plan.  Firstly, 
the maturity of the industry sector in which a technology-based venture operates - and more specifically the 
emergence  (or not yet)  of a dominant design  (Utterback,  1994) - may influence the need for adaptation.  In 
mature  markets,  dominant designs,  process  technologies,  and  strategies  are  clear.  New  businesses  have 
few difficulties identifying the accepted, viable business model for the industry. Growth markets, on the other 
hand,  are  viable  but  turbulent.  There  may  be  multiple  options  for  how  to  compete  within  an  overarching 
dominant  design.  And  in  emergent  markets,  the  timing  of  commercial  takeoff  and  the  viability  of  certain 
business  models  are  impossible to  predict.  In  immature  industries,  the  unavoidable presence  of ambiguity 
and risk may increase the need for adaptation (as suggested by Morris et aI., 1999). 
Secondly,  the  need  for  a new  technology-based  venture  to  adapt  its  initial  business  model  may  be 
influenced  by  the  capital  intensity  of the  sector  in  which  it  operates.  One  would  logically  reason  that  the 
need for large investments (R&D  and  other types)  hinders shifts in business models.  However, under these 
circumstances,  the  need for adaptation increases, since failure will  lead to greater losses.  Indeed,  whereas 
a small financial loss will not immediately jeopardize survival,  new businesses may not be able to overcome 
the obsolescence of large investments. 
As we already noted, adapting various aspects of the  business model may be necessary not only to find  an 
appropriate place in the environment or to find the most appropriate environment; it is also necessary when 
environmental  circumstances  change  (see  for  example  the  work  of Tuominen  et  aI.,  2002;  Oktemgil  and 
Greenley,  1997;  Hrebiniak and  Joyce,  1985,  Van  de  Ven  and  Poole,  1995,  Jankowicz,  2000).  In the  latter 
case, established companies as well as new businesses may need to change course. Of important influence 
in  this  respect  is  the  regime  of  technological  opportunity  in  a sector.  Technological  opportunity  "can  be 
regarded as  the  set of production possibilities for  translating research  resources  into  new techniques  of 
production" (Cohen and  Levin, 1989, p.  214).  It influences the pace and the direction of technical advance in 
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than  in others.  If the industry's technology advances, established companies as well  as new businesses will 
need  to  adapt  their  business  model  in  order  to  remain  competitive.  We  need  to  control  for  this  type  of 
adaptation since it is not what we are interested in for the current study. 
We therefore want to verify whether: 
H3a:  The sector of the new business has a significant effect on failure rates. 
H3b:  The  effect of business model adaptation on failure rates  differs depending  on the sector in 
which new businesses operate. 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
Data source 
The  unit  of  analysis  is  the  new  business.  The  data  source  used  is  the  annual  CorpTech  directory.  This 
directory  provides  information on  technology businesses that operate  in  the  United  States,  including those 
that are domestic- and foreign-owned, public and private,  parent companies,  and divisions.  Each year,  each 
firm  is listed with (amongst other information) its product codes (Corp Tech codes as well as SIC codes)  and 
product descriptions.  Sometimes  sectors  are  mentioned  multiple  times,  each  time  with  a different product 
and/or service description.  In  addition,  a short text describes the  markets/industries the  company  is selling 
to,  and whether or not it is a business unit of an established company.  Both the textual  description  and  the 
Corp  Tech  codes,  SIC  codes  and  product  descriptions  indicate  whether  the  company  offers  products, 
services or both. 
Directories  have  been  used  as  a data  source  in  existing  research  (see  for  example  Baum,  Calabrese  & 
Silverman,  2000;  Lu  & Beamish,  2001;  Romanelli  & Tushman,  1994).  Data  from  the  CorpTech  directory 
have  recently  been  used  by  Puranam  and  Srikanth  (2004,  working  paper)  to  investigate  the  structural 
integration  of  acquisitions  and  by  Lee  (2004,  working  paper)  to  identify  firms'  entry  into  the  network 
switching  market.  The  main  asset of the Corp Tech  directory is that it covers young  as  well  as established, 
small  as  well  as  large,  and  private  as  well  as  public  companies.  Firms  must  be  independently  managed 
operations, although they may be divisions of larger entities. According to Corp Tech, of a random sample of 
10 200 emerging companies presented in the Corp Tech directory between 1989 and  2003, 88% did not appear 
in  D&B's Million  Dollar directory,  77% were not mentioned  in  Wards' Directory,  and  81 % were missing from 
the Thomas register.  Corp Tech  identifies firms from  a variety of sources,  including technology newsletters, 
industry  (vertical)  trade  associations,  technology  related  press  clipping  services,  economic  development 
agencies,  manufacturers'  directories,  other  databases  and  interviews  with  related  manufacturers.  When  a 
previously unknown company is identified, an interviewer calls the company and conducts a fifteen to twenty 
minute interview, typically with a senior member of the sales or marketing staff. The interviewer formulates a 
profile,  coding the products or services. The company is then requested to proofread the profile and correct 
any errors. Profiles are updated approximately once per year. 
Sample 
For  each  of the  directory  editions  1992  until  1996,  we  selected  independent start-ups  and  (independently 
managed)  business units of established  companies that were  listed for the first time  in  that edition,  with a 
complete  profile,  and  had  been  founded  only  one  or  two  years  prior  to  the  edition.  This  means  that  the 
average business  is  only  1.5 years old  when  it enters our sample.  Although  we  will  not be  able to capture 
the very early - and probably more frequent - changes in business model, previous case study research has 
shown  that  it  can  take  ventures  multiple  years  to  find  their  first  viable  market  application.  Clarysse  and 
Moray  (2004)  study  an  academic  venture  that  adapts  is  business  model  over a period  of four  and  a half 
years.  Andries  et al.  (2004)  in  their  study  of academic  as  well  as  non-academic  ventures,  find  that it can 
take ventures up to seven years to define a viable business model. We are therefore confident that with an 
average age of 1.5 years at entry, this sample will enable us to study this search and adaptation process. 
Of  these  one  and  two  year  old  companies,  we  selected  the  ones  active  in  the  automation,  biotech  and 
environmental  industry.  We  selected  these  three  sectors  based  on  various  criteria:  firstly,  they  have  a 
considerable  number of independent  as  well  as  dependent start-ups.  Secondly,  these  three  sectors  differ 
with  respect  to  maturity  and  stability.  Whereas  the  biotech  industry  is  generally  considered  to  be  an 
emerging  and  rapidly  developing  sector,  the  automation  industry  has  more the  characteristics of a growth 
market,  being  viable  but  still  somewhat  turbulent.  The  majority  of  the  companies  in  our  environmental 
industry sample  are  active  in  traditional  waste  management and  water treatment,  characterized  by  some 
degree  of  maturity.  Thirdly,  there  are  almost  no  companies  in  the  Corptech  database that were  active  at 
start-up in more than one of these three sectors. New businesses that started out in more than one of these 
three sectors were removed  from the sample.  This selection criterion allows us to use dummy variables for 
11 initial sector (see below). The use of these three criteria led to a total sample of 117 businesses.  For each of 
them,  we  coded  the  Corp Tech  information from  the first year they were  listed  in the  directory until  2003  (if 
they  were  still  listed  as  existing  in  the  2003  edition)  or  until  the  year they  went  out  of business,  were  no 
longer traceable, or were taken over by another company. This led to a total number of 681  observations (or 
an  average  of about 6 observations  per  business).  The  distribution  of the  sample  over  Corp Tech  sectors 
and business background is given in Table  I. 
-INSERT TABLE I ABOUT HERE-
Variables 
Outcome variables 
We  are  interested in the survival of the company,  as opposed to going out of business,  or being taken over 
by another company.  For each year,  we code in the variable STATUS whether the company is alive,  out of 
business,  taken  over by another company,  or whether Corp Tech  was unable to recontact the company  (in 
this case, the business probably no longer exists). 
Explanatory variables 
a)  Company and sector variables 
A dummy variable DEP is used to indicate whether a business is an  independent start-up or a business unit 
of an established company.  In  order to correct for the effects of maturity,  capital intensity and technological 
advance,  we  discern  between  three  sectors:  automation,  biotech  and  environmental,  represented 
respectively  by  sector  dummies  (SEC1  representing  automation,  and  SEC2  representing  biotech,  with 
environmental  as  the  comparison  base).  As  explained  above,  these  sectors  where  chosen  to  minimize 
overlap between them. 
b)  Constructing measures of  adaptation 
Two time-dependent variables CMKTt and  CCMKTt represent respectively the change  in target markets for 
a specific year and the cumulative change  in target markets up to that year.  Each year,  we coded whether 
or  not  the  target  market  has  changed  as  a 0 (no  change)  or  1 (at  least  one  change)  compared  to  the 
previous year as CMKT.  For each year, we then calculate the cumulative number of target market changes 
until that year  as  CCMKT.  By coding  cumulative changes,  we  intend to  check whether there  exist learning 
12 effects with  respect to  adaptation of the  business  model.  Indeed,  we  assume that a cumulative  number of 
market changes will create experience effects within the company.  This relates to the literature on  dynamic 
capabilities  and  the  resource-based  view  of the  firm,  in  which  organizational  capabilities  are  described  as 
high-level  routines  (Winter,  2000).  A routine  is  'a  behavior that  is  learned,  highly  patterned,  repetitious,  or 
quasi-repetitious'  (Winter,  2003).  Repetition  of a specific  pattern  of activity  (see  also  Nelson  and  Winter, 
1982) over long periods of time may hence have a cumulative or learning effect. 
In  addition,  we coded  whether or  not the  business  has  changed  from  targeting  one to targeting  more than 
one market or vice versa as CHOMt (CHOM= 1 if there is a Change from one to more than one target market 
or vice versa;  CHOM=O otherwise). Also here, a cumulative score is calculated as CCHOMt. 
We  also  coded  whether the  business  changes  between  being  a product company,  a service  company,  or 
offering both services and products. A change in a certain year is coded as CHPSt =  1 (CHPSt =0 otherwise). 
Also here, a cumulative score is calculated as CCHPSt. 
Similarly,  we  coded  whether  or  not  the  Corp Tech  codes  in  which  the  business  is  active  have  changed 
compared to the previous year as a CHCORPt  (= 0 if no change and =  1 if at least one change).  In the same 
way,  changes  in  SIC  codes  are  represented  by  the  variable  CHSICt,  and  changes  in  product  or  service 
description by the variable CHPRODt. Also here, cumulative scores are calculated as CCHCORPt, CCHSICt 
and CCHPRODt. 
We saw that in the context of new venture development, adaptation refers to the entrepreneur's willingness 
and ability to make appropriate adjustments to the business concept and marketing approach as the venture 
evolves from an initial idea or business plan through the early stages of the organizational life-cycle towards 
a more stable business (Morris et aI.,  1999; Pitt and  Kannemeyer,  2000). The business model is a construct 
that mediates the value creation  process,  by  selecting  and filtering technologies and  ideas,  and  packaging 
them  into  particular configurations  (i.e.  products  and/or  services)  to  be  offered  to  a chosen  target  market. 
The  variables  we  coded  up  allow  us  to  capture  exactly  these  adjustments  or  changes  with  respect  to 
products  or  services  offered  and  target  markets.  The  Corp Tech  data  does  unfortunately  not  allow  us  to 
capture Changes with respect to technologyii. 
13 Control variables 
We  control  for  the  size  of the  business.  Corp Tech  provides  us  with  the  number  of employees  of the  firm, 
represented  by the variable EMPL.  Unfortunately, for a number of business units of established companies, 




On  our total  sample of 117  business units and a total  of 681  observations,  we  performed a factor analysis 
on  the  variables  representing  adaptation  of the  business  model:  CMKTt  ,  CHOMt  ,  CHPSt  ,  CHCORPt  , 
CHSICt  ,  CHPRODt,  CCMKTt,  CCHOMe  CCHPSt,  CCHCORPt,  CCHSICt  and  CCHPRODt.  The  basic 
statistics for these variables are presented in  Figure 1. The results of the factor analysis are shown in  Figure 
2.  The  Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin  measure of sampling  adequacy  is  0.69,  which  is sufficient for performing factor 
analysis (Sharma, 1996, p. 116). Using the cutoff criterion eigenvalues> 1, three factors were obtained. The 
rotated  factor  pattern  shows  that  Factor  1  represents  cumulative  changes  in  products  or  services. 
Cumulative  changes  in  CorpTech  codes  (CCHCORP),  SIC  codes  (CCHSIC)  and  product  description 
(CCHPROD)  all have factor loadings for  Factor 1 of about 0.9.  CCHPS  (cumulative changes from  products 
to services or vice versa)  has a factor loading of about 0.7.  Factor 2 represents yearly changes  in  products 
or  services.  Yearly  changes  in  CorpTech  codes  (CHCORP),  SIC  codes  (CHSIC)  and  product description 
(CHPROD)  all  have factor  loadings for  Factor 2 of 0.9  and  more.  CHPS  (yearly  changes from  products to 
services  or  vice  versa)  has  a factor  loading  of  about  0.6.  Finally,  Factor  3 represents  changes  (both 
cumulative and yearly)  in target markets.  CHMKT,  CCHMKT,  CHOM,  and  CCHOM  all  have factor loadings 
for  Factor 3 between  0.71  and  0.78. These  high factor loadings already point to the adequacy of the factor 
solution.  In  addition,  the  root  mean  square  residual  is  0.078,  which  appears  to  be  small  implying  a good 
factor solution (Sharma, 1996, pp.  107). 
- INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE -
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14 Event history analysis 
The  standardized  scoring  coefficients  that  resulted  from  the  factor  analysis  were  used  to  calculate  the 
scores  on  these  three  factors  for  each  of the  681  observations  in  our  sample.  These  scores  were  then 
drawn on  in our further analysis of business survival. We applied event history analysis,  and more precisely, 
Cox-regression with the counting  process syntax  (see Allison,  1995). Cox-regression does not require us to 
choose a particular probability distribution for survival times, increasing robustness.  In addition,  it allows for 
time varying  covariates,  ties,  and  multiple types of events.  An  advantage of the counting  process  syntax  is 
that we can accommodate for the fact that some companies enter the dataset one year and others two year 
after  being  formed.  It  also  allows  us  to  include  companies  that  disappear  from  the  directory  without  an 
indication of what happened to them. They are treated as censored at the last-known date of their existence. 
When  preparing  for  our  analysis,  we  found  that  of  our  681  observations,  363  scored  zero  on  Factor  1, 
Factor  2,  and  Factor  3,  indicating that they  had  not adapted their initial business model  in  any of the years 
we  documented.  Descriptive  statistics  for  the  total  sample,  for  the  adapted  sub-sample  and  for  the  sub-
sample that did not adapt at all are given in  Figure 3.  Survival distribution functions for both sub-samples are 
shown  in  Figures  4.  Survival curves are steeper for the  non-adapted sub-sample than for the adapted sub-
sample.  The statistics in  Figure 5 indicate that the probability of surviving  is indeed significantly higher than 
for the non-adapted sub-sample  (p  < 0.10).  In the our further analyses,  we then  investigated  more  in  detail 
whether this difference in survival rates could actually be attributed to differences in adaptive behavior. 
- INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE -
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The  presence  of a large  number  of non-adapted  businesses  and  the  related  large  number  of zero values 
made  estimation  unreliable  due  to  a lack  of variability  in  the  data.  We  therefore  decided  to  perform  Cox-
regression  on  the  sub-sample  of  62  businesses  which  had  undergone  at  least  one  change  in  business 
model,  and therefore had at least one score for Factor 1,  Factor 2,  or Factor 3 different from zero in at least 
one  year.  This  approach  allows  us  to  examine  the  effects  of  change  on  survival  within  the  group  of 
companies  that adopted  changes,  not yet taking  into account the  comparison  with  the  companies that did 
not experience  any  changes  in  business  model.  The  distribution  of the  adapted  sub-sample  over  sectors 
and company background  is  given in Table  II.  It consists of 400 observations.  In a first part of the analysis, 
15 we  restrict  ourselves  to  this  adapted  sub-sample.  In  a second  part.  we  further  test  the  hypotheses  put 
forward  in  this  paper by complementing the  sub-sample  with  various  runs  of randomly chosen  businesses 
that  never  changed  their  business  model.  Using  this  procedure,  we  are  able  to  overcome  the 
overrepresentation of businesses that never changed their business model  in the overall  sample leading to 
problems of statistical interpretation and validity (similar to Jackknife procedure, Tabachnik & Fidel,  1996,  p. 
328). 
-INSERT TABLE  II  ABOUT HERE-
For  our  sub-sample  consisting  of 400  observations  relating  to  companies that at least had  one  change  in 
their  business  model,  we  estimated  the  hazard  that  a business  does  not  survive  (i.e.  that  it  goes  out  of 
business, that it is taken over by another company,  or that Corp Tech  is unable to recontact it) through  Cox 
regression.  To  avoid  the  problem  of  causal  ambiguity,  we  used  a one-year  time  lag  between  the  time-
dependent covariates  on  the  one  hand  and  the  status  of the  company  (whether  or  not it  survived)  on  the 
other  hand.  In  a first  regression  model,  we  investigated  the  relationship  between  the  score  on  Factor  1, 
Factor 2 and Factor 3 at time t and the sector and (in)dependence of the business on the one hand, and the 
hazard at time t+ 1 on the other hand. We also included interaction effects between (in) dependence and the 
factors  representing  adaptation,  and  also  between  sector  and  the  factors  representing  adaptation.  The 
results are shown in  Figure 6. 
We find that the sector of the company and whether or not it is  independent do not have a significant direct 
effect on the hazard rate. This means that we can reject our Hypotheses 2b and  3a. We must note however 
that a direct effect of (in)dependence  may  be  obscured  because of a lack of detail  in  the  Corp Tech  data. 
Indeed,  the  Corp Tech  data  does  not  allow  us  to  measure  the  similarity  between  a new  business  units 
activity  and  that  of  its  parent  organization.  Because  of  pOSSibly  negative  as  well  as  positive  effects  of 
imprinting  from  the  parent  organization  on  the  new  business  unit  it  may  be  that  new  business  units 
operating  in  different product-market environments as their parent have a smaller chance of surviving than 
independent  ventures,  which  in  turn  may  have  a smaller  chance  of  surviving  than  new  business  units 
operating  in  environments  similar  to  those  of  their  parent  organizations.  For  unrelated  business  units, 
imprinting  may  give  rise  to  inertia,  inhibiting  development  and  success.  For  related  business  units,  the 
positive  effects  of  parental  imprinting  may  gain  the  upperhand.  Indeed,  Feeser  and  Williard  (1990)  found 
that new technology-based  business units which  obtained  high  growth were similar to their parents  in  both 
the technology utilized and the markets served. 
16 We find  that Factor 1.  Factor 2,  and  Factor 3 all  have a positive and  significant effect on failure rates.  The 
fact  that  both  Factor  1 and  Factor  2 have  a significant  effect  means  that  there  is  a cumulative  effect  of 
product/service  changes  over  multiple  years.  We  could  not  study  this  distinction  between  yearly  and 
cumulative adaptation of target markets, since both are represented by Factor 3. 
When  we  look  at  the  interaction  effects,  we  see  that  this  negative  main  effect  of  adaptation  is  highly 
moderated by sector. Our Hypothesis 3b is supported. The positive effect of cumulative changes in products 
(F actor  1)  on  the  hazard  is  reversed  for  companies  in  the  automation  and  biotech  sector  (represented 
respectively by the SECl  and  SEC2  dummies).  The positive effect of changes in target markets (Factor 3) 
on  the  hazard  almost  cancels  out  for  companies  in  the  automation  sector  and  is  even  reversed  for 
businesses  in  the  biotech  sector.  Similar although  statistically insignificant tendencies  are found  for yearly 
changes  in  products  (Factor  2).  Our  findings  suggest  that  the  need  for  adaptation  is  key  in  immature, 
capital-intensive  and  high-velocity  industries  such  as  the  biotech  industry.  However,  adaptation  appears 
detrimental in mature, stable industries such as the environmental sector. 
We also find  significant interaction effects between adaptation and  (in)  dependence. The positive effects of 
Factor 1,  Factor 2,  and  also  Factor 3 on the hazard of failing  are significantly reduced for business units of 
established  companies,  meaning  that  adaptation  reduces  failure  rates  in  dependent  business  units  as 
compared to  in  independent ventures.  This  supports our  Hypothesis  2a.  There  hence appears to  be faster 
or  more  efficient  learning  or  adaptation  in  business  units  of  existing  organizations  as  compared  to  in 
independent business ventures. Also here it would have been opportune to investigate whether the similarity 
between  parent and daughter organization is relevant  in this respect.  Monitoring by the parent organization 
may  restrict  adaptation  to  certain  (related)  business  models,  which  may  render  adaptation  in  non-related 
business units less efficient. 
We  can  conclude  that  the  total  effect  of  adaptation  on  failure  rates  differs  greatly  depending  on  the  (in) 
dependence and the industry of the business  (see Table  III).  Adaptation therefore is not a goal  in  itself.  On 
the contrary, the need for adaptation is highly company and sector specific. 
-INSERT TABLE  III ABOUT HERE-
In  a second  regression  model,  we  added the number of employees as a time-varying  control variable  (also 
shown  in  Figure  6).  The  size  of  the  firm  represented  by  the  number  of  employees  does  not  have  a 
17 significant effect on  the  hazard.  The estimates for the  other variables are very similar to the  ones found  in 
our first model. 
In a third regression model (also shown  in  Figure 6), we added the squared Factor 1. squared Factor 2,  and 
squared  Factor  3 to  test  for  a nonlinear  relationship  between  adaptation  and  failure  rates.  We  find  no 
significant effect of these quadratic terms on the hazard and we therefore reject our Hypothesis 1. 
- INSERT FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE -
In a second part of our analysis, we randomly selected 10 companies that had never changed their business 
model. We added them to the adapted sub-sample and re-ran our analysis. We repeated this procedure five 
times.  In this way we are able to overcome the overrepresentation of non-adapted businesses in the overall 
sample  leading  to  problems  of  statistical  interpretation  and  validity  (similar  to  Jackknife  procedure, 
Tabachnik  & Fidel,  1996,  p.  328).  The  results  for  these  five  Cox-regressions  are  shown  in  Figure  7.  The 
regression  coefficients  remain  comparable  over  the  different  samples  and  for  some  terms  statistical 
significance is  also  preserved.  More specifically,  the  interaction  effects of Factor 1 (cumulative changes  in 
products)  and factor 2 (changes  in target markets)  with  sector/industry remain  significant in  the  majority of 
the samples.  Also the  interaction effect between the various forms of adaptation  (as represented  by Factor 
1.  Factor 2 and  Factor 3)  and  (in)  dependence is statistically significant in the majority of the samples.  The 
results in  Figure 7 hence support the robustness of our findings.iii 
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DISCUSSION AND MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS 
We  performed  a factor analysis of 117  businesses and a total  of 681  observations.  We  demonstrated that 
new businesses that made at least one adaptation to their initial business model  have a significantly higher 
probability of surviving than businesses that never made any adaptation at all. 
We  then  analyzed  in  detail  the  effect  of  adaptation  on  new  businesses'  failure  rates.  Through  factor 
analysis,  we  found  that  adaptation  to  a company's  initial  business  model  can  be  factored  into  three 
components:  cumulative  changes  in  products  or  services,  yearly  changes  in  products  or  services,  and 
18 changes  (both  cumulative  and  yearly)  in  target markets.  We  found  that al!  three factors  have a significant 
main  effect on failure  rates,  indicating that there exists not only a simple,  but also a cumulative or learning 
effect of adaptation with respect to products or services. These effects of adaptation on the hazard of failure 
are positive. 
However,  we find  that these relationships  are significantly moderated  by the  sector of the  business and  by 
whether  or  not  the  business  is  independent.  Whereas  adaptation  can  be  detrimental  for  a certain  type 
(independent versus dependent) of business in a certain sector, the opposite may be true for a different type 
of business in the same or in a different industry. In general, adaptation has a negative effect on failure rates 
in biotech businesses, and a positive effect in environmental businesses.  In the automation sector, the effect 
can be negative or positive depending on the (in) dependence of the business. Our findings suggest that the 
need  for  adaptation  is  key  in  immature,  capital-intensive  and  high-velocity  industries  such  as  the  biotech 
industry.  However,  adaptation  appears  detrimental  in  mature,  stable  industries  such  as  the  environmental 
sector.  In general, the effect of adaptation also differs between independent businesses and  business units 
of  established  companies.  The  interaction  effect  between  adaptation  and  (in)  dependence  is  negative, 
meaning  that  adaptation  reduces  failure  rates  in  dependent  business  units  as  compared  to  independent 
ventures.  Also  here  we  find  that  interaction  effects  are  significant  for  cumulative  as  well  as  for  yearly 
changes,  indicating  again  the  presence  of  a learning  effect.  There  hence  appears  to  be  faster  or  more 
efficient  learning  or  adaptation  in  business  units  of  existing  organizations  as  compared  to  independent 
business ventures.  It would  have been  opportune to  investigate whether the similarity between  parent and 
daughter  organization  is  relevant  in  this  respect.  Monitoring  by  the  parent  organization  may  restrict 
adaptation  to  certain  (related)  business  models,  which  would  render  adaptation  in  non-related  business 
units  less  efficient.  Unfortunately,  the  nature  of  the  Corp Tech  data  did  not  allow  us  to  study  similarities 
between the parent company and its business units. 
The  findings  that  the  effect  of  adaptation  is  highly  dependent  on  the  sector  in  which  a new  business  is 
operating  and  on  whether it is  an  independent business or a business unit of an  established  company,  has 
some serious implications for entrepreneurial management.  Existing  literature suggests that adaptation is a 
necessary condition for survival.  Our research  clearly indicates that this cannot be taken  as a general rule. 
Adaptation  is  not a goal  in  itself.  On the contrary,  the  need  for adaptation  is  highly company-specific.  New 
businesses will  feel  more or less need to adapt their initial  business  model  depending  on  the  industry they 
are  in  and  on whether they were set up independently or as part of an established organization.  In general, 
our findings suggest that the  need  for  adaptation  is  higher  in  immature,  capital-intensive and  high-velocity 
19 industries  and  that  adaptation  is  more  beneficial  for  business  units  of  established  companies  than  for 
independent ventures. 
Contrary  to  findings  in  the  existing  literature,  we  did  not find  a curvilinear relationship  between  adaptation 
and  new business's hazard of failing. There are two possible explanations for this.  Firstly,  existing research 
has not used samples of very young  and small  companies.  This could  mean that.  although  over-adaptation 
is  a concern  in  medium-sized  and  large  established  companies,  high  degrees  of  adaptation  are  not 
dangerous  in  new,  small companies. A second  explanation  might be that due to resource constraints,  new 
businesses would not easily succeed in adapting their business model. This would  mean that although  high 
degrees  of adaptation  might lead  to  higher failure  rates,  this  is  not an  issue  since  new businesses do  not 
have the resources to engage in over-adaptation. A third possibility is that existing research focuses on the 
relationship  between  adaptation  and  performance  in  terms  of sales,  profits,  etc.  In  our  analysis,  we  used 
survival  as  the  outcome  variable.  It  might  be  that  over-adaptation  indeed  leads  to  a decline  in  sales  or 
profits, but that this decline is not significant enough to threaten the survival of over-adapting businesses. 
We  did  not find  a direct effect of  sector,  (in)  dependence  and  firm  size  on  businesses'  failure  rates.  The 
absence of a direct effect of firm  size and  (in)dependence suggest that liabilities of newness and smallness 
do  not have a direct effect on  survival, contrary to the  accepted view in the  literature.  However,  it might be 
the case that they do have an  indirect effect by affecting the adaptive potential of the new business. This is 
something that needs further research.  In  addition,  we  must  note that a direct effect of (in)dependence  on 
survival  may  be  obscured  because  the  Corptech  data  do  not  allow  us  to  take  into  account  similairities 
between business units and their parent organizations. 
LIMITATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
An  important advantage of the  Corp Tech  database  is that it contains yearly data  for companies  over time. 
Such  longitudinal data  are relatively difficult to find  for young  businesses.  However,  the  database also  has 
its  limitations.  We  were  able  to  discern  between  independent start-ups  and  business  units of established 
companies.  However,  it would also be interesting to look at spin-outs of universities and  research  institutes. 
These companies are listed in the CorpTech database as independent businesses. The same goes for spin-
outs of established companies.  In addition, the Corp Tech data do not allow us to look at similarities between 
the activities of business units and the activities of their parent organization.  We were therefore not able to 
20 discern  between  positive  and  negative  effects  of  parental  imprinting  on  business  units,  although  these 
effects may influence the direct effect of (in)dependence on performance,  as well as the interaction effect of 
(in)dependence and adaptation. 
Another  disadvantage  of  the  Corp Tech  database  is  that  is  does  not  contain  reliable  information  on  the 
financials  of the  businesses.  Because  most businesses  in  our sample are very young  and  small,  we  were 
not able to find financial information  in other data sources. This means that we cannot control for the effects 
of e.g.  financial  slack  on  the  hazard  of dying.  Also,  there  are  no  other  performance  indicators  beside  the 
survival  or failure of a business.  An  additional limitation of our research  is that we used sector dummies to 
look at interaction effect of adaptation and sector.  Further research should have separate, more fine-grained 
indicators  of industry  maturity,  capital  intensity,  and  technological  opportunity  in  order  to  disentangle  the 
individual effects of these sector characteristics. 
We believe that the selection of our sample added to the existing literature,  mainly because the businesses 
under study were on average only 1.5 years old when they entered our database.  However, the sample we 
used is relatively small.  Further research should validate our findings for a larger sample of new businesses. 
Additional  suggestions for further research  emerge from  our findings.  Firstly, the fact that we  did  not find  a 
curvilinear  relationship  between  adaptation  and  survival  deserves  more  attention.  Secondly,  our  results 
suggest that liabilities  of newness  and  smallness  (as  represented  by  company  size)  do  not  have a direct 
effect on survival, contrary to the accepted view in the literature. New studies should investigate whether the 
effect found  in  previous research is actually an indirect one, caused by the effect of smallness and newness 
on the adaptive potential of the new business. 
21 APPENDIX 1 
Cox-regression for randomly enlarged samples (20 companies added) 
Variable  Model 
n=520 
Sec1  -0.7101 
Sec2  -1.4983 
Dep  -0.3794 
Fact1  1.2233 
Fact2  0.8856 
Fact3  7.4238 
Fact1  x  sec1  -1.2278 
Fact1  x  sec2  -18.3680 
Fact2  x  sec1  -0.5211 
Fact2  x  sec2  -6.585 
Fact3  x  sec1  -6.8348 
Fact3  x  sec2  -94.9299 
Fact1  x  dep  -0.8949 
Fact2  x  dep  -0.9754 
Fact3  x  dep  -5.6887 
(*)  significant at  0.10  level 
(**)  significant at  0.05  level 
Parameter Estimate 
1  Model  2 
n=503 
-1.0687  * 
-1.8607  * 
-0.9219 
*  0.5908 
0.0439 
*  4.4847 
-0.6668 
-21.3520  * 
0.1654 
-7.3048  * 
-4.2553 





Model  3 
n=482 
-0.5038 
-1.8187  * 
0.1004 
1. 3345  ** 
1.0100 
8.5769  * 




-8.4414  * 
-85.6604 
-1.2729  * 
-1.2480  * 
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27 TABLES 
Automation  Biotech  Environmental 
Independent  27  16  22 
Business unit of  15  16  21 
established company 
Total  42  32  43 
Table I:  Sample distribution (Number of companies) 
Automation  Biotech  Environmental 
Independent  18  12  8 
Business unit of  7  9  8 
established company 
Total  25  21  16 
T  able II:  distribution of companies for adapted sub-sample 
Automation  Biotech  Environmental 
Independent  Faet7:  7.648-7.8087 (-)  Faet7:  7.6487-27.3076 (-)  Faet7:  7.6487 (+) 
Faet2:  7.4437-7.0737 (+)  Faet2:  7.4437-8.0832 (-)  Faet2:  7.4437 (+) 
Faet3:  70.3426-70. 7384 (+)  Faet3:  70.3426-772. 7567 (-)  Faet3:  70.3426 (+) 
Business unit  Faet7:  7.6487-7.8087-7.3867 (-)  Faet7:  7.6487 -27.3076 - 7.3867 (-)  Faet7:  7.6487 - 7.3867 (+) 
of established  Faet2:  7.4437-7.0737-7.3043 (-)  Faet2:  7.4437 -8.0832 - 7.3043 (-)  Faet2:  7.4437 - 7.3043 (+) 
company  Faet3:  70.3426-70. 7384-8.3730 (-)  Fact:  70.3426 - 772. 7567 -8.3730 (-)  Faet3:  70.3426 - 8.3730 (+) 
.. 
Table III: Effect of adaptation on hazard of failing 
28 FIGURES 
Descriptives 
chmkt  cchmkt  chom  cchom  chps  cchps  chcorp  cchorp  chsic  cchsic  chprod  cchprod 
mean  0,0279  0,1322  0,0103  0,0485  0,0264  0,1160  0,3348  1,4670  0,2261  0,7526  0,3319  1,4993 
Std dey  0,1648  0,3798  0,1009  0,2149  0,1605  0,3715  1,0429  2,6143  1,0220  1,9023  1,1587  3,0598 
Correlations 
chmkt  cchmkt  chom  cchom  chps  cchps  chcorp  cchorp  chsic  cchsic  chprod  Cchprod 
chmkt  1  0,4578  0,6015  0,2940  0,1388  0,1873  0,2279  0,1165  0,1862  0,1388  0,2133  0,1240 
cchmkt  0,4578  1  0,2714  0,6061  0,1115  0,3602  0,1183  0,2873  0,1114  0,3257  0,1274  0,2835 
chom  0,6015  0,2714  1  0,4516  -0,0168  0,1643  0,0930  0,0765  0,1048  0,0984  0,0965  0,1119 
cchom  0,2940  0,6061  0,4516  1  0,0054  0,2427  -0,0003  0,0670  -0,0042  0,0693  0,0180  0,1041 
chps  0,1388  0,1115  -0,0168  0,0054  1  0,4910  0,4477  0,2228  0,4982  0,2437  0,4746  0,2425 
cchps  0,1873  0,3602  0,1643  0,2427  0,4910  1  0,2754  0,5574  0,3058  0,5791  0,3238  0,6463 
chcorp  0,2279  0,1183  0,0930  -0,0003  0,4477  0,2754  1  0,4652  0,8776  0,4314  0,9277  0,4263 
cchorp  0,1165  0,2873  0,0765  0,0670  0,2228  0,5574  0,4652  1  0,3954  0,9137  0,4420  0,9305 
chsic  0,1862  0,1114  0,1048  -0,0042  0,4982  0,3058  0,8776  0,3954  1  0,4598  0,8177  0,3692 
cchsic  0,1388  0,3257  0,0984  0,0693  0,2437  0,5791  0,4314  0,9137  0,4598  1  0,4023  0,8450 
chprod  0,2133  0,1274  0,0965  0,0180  0,4746  0,3238  0,9277  0,4420  0,8177  0,4023  1  0,4742 
cchprod  0,1240  0,2835  0,1119  0,1041  0,2425  0,6463  0,4263  0,9305  0,3692  0,8450  0,4742  1 
Figure 1: Descriptive statistics and correlations 
29 Kaiser's  Measure  of  Sampling Adequacy:  Overall  MSA  =  0.68592579 
3  factors  will be  retained by the  MINEIGEN  criterion. 
Rotated  Factor Pattern 
Factor1  Factor2  Factor3 
chmkt  -0.01496  0.24000  0.76226 
cchmkt  0.34515  -0.02103  0.71099 
chom  -0.02256  0.08268  0.77379 
cchom  0.11280  -0.11632  0.77213 
chps  0.17697  0.61077  0.03780 
cchps  0.69401  0.20700  0.24665 
chcorp  0.22082  0.92447  0.04954 
cchcorp  0.92313  0.24081  0.02564 
chsic  0.20380  0.90252  0.04436 
cchsic  0.89752  0.24706  0.05949 
chprod  0.23704  0.90420  0.05851 
cchprod  0.91941  0.23270  0.06146 
Final  Communality Estimates:  Total=8.808892 
Root  Mean  Square  Off-Diagonal  Residuals:  Overall  =  0.07829047 
Standardized Scoring Coefficients 
Factor1  Factor2  Factor3 
chmkt  -0.11013  0.08603  0.33911 
cchmkt  0.08455  -0.08260  0.29173 
chom  -0.08602  0.02374  0.34767 
cchom  0.00374  -0.08065  0.33954 
chps  -0.04128  0.21408  -0.00803 
cchps  0.22070  -0.04470  0.05123 
chcorp  -0.08066  0.33256  -0.01182 
cchcorp  0.32405  -0.06806  -0.06700 
chsic  -0.08314  0.32684  -0.01238 
cchsic  0.30997  -0.06157  -0.04986 
chprod  -0.07128  0.32133  -0.00874 
cchprod  0.32113  -0.07130  -0.05048 
Figure 2:  Results of factor analysis 
30 Full  Sample 
Sec1  Sec2  Dep  Empl  Fact1  Fact2  Fact3 
Mean  0,377  0,276  0,435  81,278  1,236  0,011  -0,161 
Std dev  0,485  0,447  0,496  323,338  2,302  0,843  0,422 
Adapted  Sub-sample 
Sec1  Sec2  Dep  Empl  Fact1  Fact2  Fact3 
Mean  0,372  0,365  0,383  105,322  2,104  0,018  -0,274 
Std dev  0,484  0,482  0,487  412,649  2,684  1,100  0,522 
Non-adapted Sub-sample 
Sec1  Sec2  Dep  Empl  Fact1  Fact2  Fact3 
Mean  0,384  0,149  0,509  46,381  °  °  ° 
Std dev  0,487  0,357  0,501  85,874  °  °  ° 
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Figure 4: Survival curves of adapted  (dotted line) and non-adapted (full line) sub-samples 
Test  of  Equality over Strata 
Pr  > 
Test  Chi-Square  DF  Chi-Square 
Log-Rank  2.8885  1  0.0892 
wilcoxon  3.4409  1  0.0636 
Figure 5:  Equality test for survival of adapted and non-adapted sub-samples 
32 Variable  Model  1 
Secl  -0.5474 
Sec2  -2.9445 
Dep  -0.1573 
Empl 
FactI  1.6487 
Fact2  1. 4431 




FactI  x  sec  1  -1.8087 
FactI  x  sec2  -21.3076 
Fact2  x  secl  -1.0737 
Fact2  x  sec2  -8.0832 
Fact3  x  sec  1  -10.1384 
Fact3  x  sec2  -112.1567 
FactI  x  dep  -1.3867 
Fact2  x  dep  -1.3043 
Fact3  x  dep  -8.3730 
(*)  significant at  0.10  level 










Figure 6:  Cox-regression for adapted sub-sample 
Parameter  Estimate 
Model  2  Model  3 
-0.3068  -0.0967 
-3.5399  -3.5308 
-0.0055  0.2782 
-0.0003  -0.0002 
1.6531  **  1.0621 
1.4353  *  1.3182 




-1.8706  *  -1.4020 
-8.4064  -8.4639 
-1.0705  -0.5870 
-2.9641  -2.6591 
-10.5398  **  -7.1083 
-46.9262  -46.9615 
-1.4403  *  -0.9694 
-1.3233  *  -0.9814 
-8.5363  *  -5.0677 
33 Parameter Estimate 
variable  Model  1  Model  1b  Model  1c  Model  1d  Model  Ie  Model  If 
n=400  n=457  n=464  n=448  n=447  n=433 
Sec  1  -0.5474  -0.8848  -0.8018  -0.6909  -0.6581  -0.7302 
Sec2  -2.9445  -3.5297  **  -1.3049  -1.6596  -0.7312  -3.4333  * 
Dep  -0.1573  -0.6849  0.2599  -0.4735  -0.1114  0.0774 
FactI  1.6487  **  1.4212  **  1.4770  **  0.5974  1. 5639  **  1.3560  ** 
Fact2  1. 4431  *  1.1169  1.1155  0.1004  1.3198  *  1.0075 
Fact3  10.3426  **  9.4876  **  8.7585  *  4.4678  9.8656  **  8.8360  * 
Factl  x  secl  -1.8087  **  -1.6225  *  -1.3461  -0.7700  -1.6682  *  -1.4373  * 
FactI  x  sec2  -21.3076  -24.4658  *  -16.5864  -18.9555  *  -15.7117  -21.1989 
Fact2  x  sec  1  -1.0737  -0.7564  -0.6108  -0.0068  -0.9745  -0.7319 
Fact2  x  sec2  -8.0832  -9.2308  *  -5.8610  -6.3734  -5.4653  -7.8073 
Fact3  x  sec  1  -10.1384  **  -9.3096  *  -7.9841  *  -4.7137  -9.4527  *  -8.5390  * 
Fact3  x  sec2  -112.1567  *  -129.3244  *  -85.3928  -97.9981  *  -79.6126  -112.5033  * 
FactI  x  dep  -1.3867  *  -1.1416  -1.3016  *  -0.3834  -1.3659  *  -1. 3367  * 
Fact2  x  dep  -1.3043  *  -1.1000  -1.2066  *  -0.5584  -1.3249  *  -1.2179  * 
Fact3  x  dep  -8.3730  *  -7.64917  *  -7.1373  -2.8269  -8.1271  *  -7.6880  * 
(*)  significant at  0.10  level 
(**)  significant at  0.05  level 
Figure 7: Cox-regression for randomly enlarged samples (10 companies added) 
34 NOTES 
i  Audretsch  and  Mahmood  (1995).  contrary  to  the  liability of  newness  and  smallness argument above  and 
also  contrary  to  their  own  expectations,  find  that  survival  rates  are  lower for  establishments  which  are  a 
branch or a subsidiary of an existing enterprise than for new independent enterprises. Their paper does not 
comment on this finding however. 
ii  Pitt and  Kannemeyer (2000) also consider distribution, facility or space requirements,  marketing approach, 
and  personnel  resources  as  components  of the  marketing  strategy.  Morris  et  al.  (1999)  regard  financial 
requirements  as  an  additional  component.  However,  these  appear  organizational  requirements  for  a 
company to adapt its business model, but not dimensions of the (adapted) business model. 
iii  We  also randomly selected  20  non-adapted  companies,  added  them  to  the  adapted  sub-sample  and  re-
ran  our  analysis.  We  did  this  three  times.  Each  time,  the  signs  and  magnitudes  of  the  effects  were 
preserved,  although  significance  was  somewhat  lower  than  when  analyzing  the  initial  sub-sample  of 
adapted businesses (see Appendix 1). 
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